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When the Equitable Building in lower Manhattan was completed
in 1915, its formidable bulk cast a shadow over seven acres' and
brought realtors and reformers together behind the nation's first com-
prehensive zoning ordinance.2 The tension between their conflicting
desires-to encourage the intensive development of tax-generating
property, and yet to limit urban congestion-has shaped the city's zon-
ing ever since.3 Today the New York City Planning Commission is
forging a new zoning tool, heated by the demand for office space and
tempered by the recognition of the adverse consequences of unreason-
ably intensive land use. That tool is, in the parlance of planners, de-
velopment rights transfer.4
"Development rights" is planning shorthand for the amount of
floor area that may be developed on a given lot. Frequently, older
buildings such as landmarks and townhouses do not fill the imaginary,
three-dimensional envelope of space permitted by the zoning ordi-
nance. These low-rise buildings are said to possess "authorized but
unused" or "excess" development rights. By allowing the construc-
tive "transfer" of these rights from smaller structures to the sites of
new apartments or office towers, the Planning Commission intends
both to preserve the landmarks and townhouses and promote the
1. At forty-two stories, the Equitable Building represented a thirty.five million dol-
lar investment for its builder, General Thomas duPont. One hundred thousand people
entered the building daily and thirteen thousand worked in its 1,250,000 square feet of
rentable office space. The Equitable Building cut off the sunlight from tie fronts of
buildings as tall as twenty-one stories, and practically all of the surrounding owners got
reductions in their tax assessments when they proved a loss of rents due to the light
and air taken by their massive new neighbor. S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 71 (1969).
2. Woodbury, The Background and Prospects of Urban Redevelopment in the United
States, in THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 641 (C. Woodbury ed. 1953).
3. On the conflicting ends of the 1916 New York Resolution, see S. TOLL, supra note 1,
at 184-85; for a similar conclusion regarding the 1961 Resolution see S. MAKIELSKI, TimE
POLITICS OF ZONING 106 (1966).
4. The same device has been called "air rights transfer" by both reporters and lawyers.
See, e.g., Burks, City Wants Air Rights to Hop, Skip, and Jump, N.Y. Times, April 26,
1970, § 8, at 1, col. 1; Conti, Groups Fight to Stop Leveling of Landmarks by Urban
Developers, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1970, at 1, col. 1; Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New
York City, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 372, 374 (1971). However, the technique does not
entail the transfer of "air rights."
The latter are a property interest in a three-dimensional location in space. Develop.
ment rights, on the other hand, are simply a governmental license to build a de.
fined amount of floor area as measured by the amount of lot area that has been
constructively "transferred" to the project site.
Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Land.
marks, 85 HARv. L. REV. 574, 592 n.58 (1972).
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construction of office buildings and luxury apartments, with their
greater assessed valuation.
Theoretically, development rights transfer does not add to the
overall congestion of a district: The new floor area permitted by the
transfer has all been "authorized" by the area's original bulk regu-
lations. This fiction conveniently ignores the fact that the rights
transferred were hitherto "unused," and thus did not add to the dis-
trict's needs for light, air, open space, transportation, and utilities.
By encouraging the intensification of actual-as opposed to hypo-
thetical-urban density, development rights transfer may well cast
a new shadow over New York.
The use and potential abuse of this technique is of considerable
import to other American cities. Just as the pioneering ordinance
of 1916 had significant influence throughout the United States and
was widely emulatedA so also has New York's plan for development
rights transfer in aid of landmark preservation already attracted
national attention. It seems reasonable to expect that the Planning
Commission's variations on the theme will also be emulated. A critical
analysis now may avoid the making of the same zoning mistakes "over
and over again ... because we do not have knowledge of what is ap-
plicable across-the-board and what is unique in each community."' ,
I. The Concept of Development Rights
A. Law and Order for Buildings: The 1916 Zoning Resolution
To understand why development rights transfer may constitute a
retreat rather than an advance in city planning, a brief review of
zoning controls on building size is in order. The common law be-
queathed to the American colonies two competing principles go%-
erning a landowner's right to build skyward. The better-known is
5. See E. BAssEr, ZONING 8 (1940); H. JAMEs, LAND PLANNING 1 TIE UNrrE STATEs YOn
THE Crr, STATE, AND NATION 239 (1926).
6. On June 31, 1971, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development an-
nounced that the National Trust for Historic Preservation had been commissioned to
study the uses of the development rights transfer approach to save historic buildings.
Professor John J. Costonis, the author of the article cited in note 4 supra, is the project
director. Letter from Roger Holt, Assistant for Legal Services, Department of Field Serv-
ices of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, to author, Jan. 26, 1972, on file at
Yale Law Journal.
7. H. PERLoFF, A NATIONAL PROGLAM OF RESEARCH1 IN HOUSING AND URBAN REDEVELOP-
MENT AND A SUGGESTED APPROACH 20 (Washington, Resources for the Future. Inc.. 1961).
quoted in Sussna, Bulk Control and Zoning: The New Yorh City Experience, 43 L6.'t
ECoNOMICS 158 (1967).
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the common law right to build upwards without legal limitation.
Blackstone, elaborating on Coke,8 tied the ownership of the land sur-
face to the ownership of the superjacent space:
Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent,
upwards as well as downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usqzue
ad coelum (whoever has the land possesses all the space upwards
to an indefinite extent), is the maxim of the law; upwards,
therefore, no man may erect any building or the like to over-
hang another's land .... 9
That this maxim was not absolute is demonstrated by the fact that
the first reference to it in English case law is a note to a 1586 case,
Bury v. Pope,'0 a suit for "stopping another's lights." The Law of
Ancient Lights gave a right of action to a landowner who was cut
off from sunlight by the erection of a building on his neighbor's land,
if the first landowner had uninterruptedly enjoyed that access for
twenty years or more." However, this right to light has not fared well
in competition with the right to build. The plaintiff in Bury v. Pope
lost his suit, and the champions of light in the United States have
been no more successful.
In 1838, in Parker & Edgarton v. Foote,'2 New York's highest
court became the first state court to reject the right to light, 13 noting
that "it cannot be applied in the growing cities and villages of this
country, without working the most mischievous consequences."' 4
This frontier desire to improve newly-cleared land to the fullest was
approved in the treatises of the "American Blackstone," James Kent.
In his Commentaries on American Law (1826-1830), Chancellor
8. And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not only of water, as
hath been said, but of ayre and all other things, even up to heaven; for euits est
solum ejus est usque ad coelum ....
COKE ON LITrLETON, Lib. 1, Ch. 1, § 1, at 42 (1628), quoted in R. WRIucT, TimE LAW OF
AIRSPACE 16 n.20 (1968).
9. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18. For a detailed history of the maxim, see
Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est. ... Quousque Tandem?, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 237 (1959).
For the subsequent development of the maxim in England, see R. WRIGHT, supra note 8,
at 11-13.
10. Cro. Eliz. 118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1586). The court held that It was not a
nuisance for a landowner to build a house which shut off the light of another whose house
had been erected thirty or forty years before, since it was the complaining landowner's
"folly to build his house so near to the other's land." Id.
11. This doctrine, which is said to be the earliest attempt to assure a minimum
standard of light to the ground story of all buildings, dates back to the reign of Richard
Coeur de Lion in 1189. The practice of centuries was embodied in statute in the l're.
scription Act, 2 & 3 Win. 4, c. 71 § 3, at 448 (1832). See G. FoRD, BUILDN o HEIGt, BULK
AND FORM 62 (1931).
12. 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. 1838).
13. For collections of American cases on this point, see 3 R. POWELL, TIM LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 485 (1970); 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 556 (3d ed. 1939).
14. 19 Wend. at 318.
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Kent cited Coke for the proposition that land "has an indefinite ex-
tent, upwards as well as downwards, so as to include every thing ter-
restrial, under or over it."1u
The extent of "upwards" could afford to be "indefinite" because
the actual height of buildings, at least until 1860, was severely limited
by the available technology. Without elevators, six stories was the
limit of the most athletic tenants, and above the third floor rents de-
creased. 16 Without steel frame construction, the thickness of masonry
walls had to increase in direct proportion to their height.17
The development of steel skeleton construction18 and the inven-
tion of the elevator 9 largely removed these constraints,20 yet the law
offered no substitute. In 1865, New York was still a city of relatively
low structures, four to five stories high.2' However, in 1870, when
the first building to incorporate an elevator in its original design
rose to seven stories, one of the top floors was soon leased at twice
the rental of the city's best office accommodations.22 The lesson was
not lost on New York's builders, who were to transform lower Man-
hattan from a horizontal to a vertical city in less than two genera-
tions.23
15. 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON A.%rmic.AN Ljw 0401. On the acceptance of the
maxim usque ad coelum in America, see R. WIcwHr, supra note 8, at 31-63.
16. E. ScHuurz & W. SitNios, OrFcEs IN THE SKY 19 (1959) [hereinafter cited as OF-
FICES].
17. S. ToLL, supra note 1, at 49-50.
18. On the innovation known variously as the steel-frame building cage, or skeleton
construction, see S. GimDoN, SPACE, TIM.E AND ARcirTEcruRE 204-08 (5th ed. 1967). The
ten-story Home Insurance Company Building in Chicago, completed in 1885, was the
first American steel-frame structure. OFFICES, supra note 16, at 35-38.
19. Elisha Otis demonstrated the world's first safe elevator at the New York Crystal
Palace Exposition in 1853. Otis would dramatize his new device's reliability by having
himself pulled aloft, and then cutting the hoist rope: Quickly coming to a stop, he would
announce to the crowd, "All safe, gentlemenl" S. ToLL, supra note 1, at 47-48. Neverthe-
less, it took developers several years to appreciate the possibilities of the elevator in com-
mercial office buildings.
20. Other technical innovations also facilitated the rapid development of skyscrapers.
Edison's advances allowed electricity to be distributed to virtually every street in Man-
hattan, and by the time New York's first steel-frame building was constructed, electric
rather than gas illumination was the rule. Plate glass was mass produced by 1881. Finally,
one historian has suggested that the telephone was also vital to the growth of the sky-
scraper. See S. TOLL, supra note I, at 51.
21. Weisman, New York and the Problem of the First Skyscraper, J. OF TIIE Soe'v OF
ARCH. HIsroRIANs, Mar. 1953, at 15.
22. This was the Equitable Building:
The history of this lower Manhattan building and its successor on the site brackets
the beginning and end of the skyscraper's pre-zoning era. By disclosing the possi-
bility of elevators in office buildings, the first Equitable Building started the break-
out from the traditional five-story maximum. The following Equitable Building
carried the development of the skyscraper to such intolerable extremes that, beyond
any other structure, it may be isolated as the one building which was a final cause
of zoning law.
S. ToL, supra note 1, at 48.
23. In 1894, the cross atop Trinity Church lost its title as the highest point in New
York, and the same year Harper's Weekly proclaimed "The Age of Sk)scrapers." In 1896,
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Aesthetic considerations aside, there are three major reasons for
building high: a need for concentration of certain functions in close
association; a shortage of land; and simple prestige.2" On the
southern tip of the island of Manhattan all three factors exist. Con-
tinued growth in the nation's trade and industry demanded the close
proximity of brokers, bankers, lawyers, and corporate officers."O
Their demand for space has in turn doubled and tripled property
values in the business center.26 Moreover, it was at least partly for
the prestige of owning the largest commercial office building in the
world that General duPont erected the infamous Equitable Build.
ing, which helped provoke the passage of the first New York City
Zoning Resolution. 27
The 1916 Resolution was based on the conclusions and recom-
mendations of the Heights of Buildings Commission, a body created by
the Board of Estimate and Apportionment in 1913.28 Their report
the words "sky line" were used for the first time. J. KOUWENIIOVEN, THE COLUMBIA
HISTORICAL PORTRAIT OF NEW YORK 394 (1953). For a list of the names and heights of
New York's office towers through 1915, just prior to the passage of the city's first zoning
ordinance, see OFFICES, supra note 16, at 64-72.
24. Gregory, Thoughts on the Architecture of High Buildings, in SVMNI'Osium ON TEI
DESIGN OF HIGH BUILDINGS 345 (S. Mackey ed. 1962). G. L. SULLIVAN, The Tall Office
Building Artistically Considered, in KINDERGARTEN CHATS AND OTHER WRITINGS 202 (1947).
25. By 1900, the port of New York was unloading nearly two-thirds of all American
imports and sending on forty per cent of our exports. Because of the city's trade leader-
ship, most banks kept reserve deposits there, and this accumulation of funds in turn
made New York the security trading center of the nation. By 1900, sixty-nline of the
country's 185 largest industrial combinations had their headquarters in the city. OFFIMCS,
supra note 16, at 55-57.
26. Id. at 57. Indeed, between 1875 and 1925, land values increased so rapidly that
it became economically prudent to demolish even fairly new buildings in order to use
the land more intensively. See Nelson, Appraisal of Air Rights, 23 AIPRAISAL J. 495 (1955).
cited in Costonis, supra note 4, at 589 n.53. As city planner George Ford exphtlned
in his classic study:
As business increases, not in arithmetical proportion to population but according to
a power of the increase in population, the intensity of business is greater in the larger
cities. This causes a more rapid rise in land values of those cities and consequently
quicker obsolescence of their office buildings.
G. FoRD, supra note 11, at 123-24.
27. On the construction of the second Equitable Building and the opposition to it,
see C. RODGERS, NEW YoRK PLANS FOR THE FUTmE 163-64 (1943); S. TOLL, supra note 1,
at 68-71; OFFiCEs, supra note 16, at 75-81. Besides the owners and tenants of office build-
ings in the congested financial district, there were two other groups which supported
a comprehensive zoning resolution. Urban reformers wanted to insure adequate light
and air to the crowded tenements of the lower East Side. See Williams, The Evolution
of Zoning, 15 Am. J. OF ECON. & Soc. 253 (1956). And the merchants on Fifth Avenue,
who had seen their business dwindle as the fashionable district was inundated by tile
garment workers from the lofts on the nearby side streets, hoped low heigh.t ilnIts
would insure that their customers would not be disturbed by strange tongues, dress,
and odors. See S. TOLL, supra note 1, at 158-59.
28. NEW YORK CITY HEIGHTS OF BUILDINGS CoMMIssION, REPORT TO TIlE COMMITrEE ON
THE HEIGHT, SIZE AND ARRANGEMENT OF BUILDINGS OF TIlE BOARD OF ESTIMATE AND At'-.
PORTIONMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1913) [hereinafter cited as 1913 REI'ORT]. The
purpose of the Commission was announced in the opening statement of the 1913 Report:
There is a growing sentiment in the community to the effect that the tine has
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articulated the twin themes which have dominated planning policy
in New York's central business districts to the present: the preser-a-
tion of property values29 and the encouragement of office buildings.30
Control was to be maintained through height,3 ' setback, 32 and area
limitations on building size. These regulations established what came
to be called the "zoning envelope," an imaginary three-dimensional
mold representing the maximum bulk to which a building might
be developed under the proposed regulations. 3 Significantly, nothing
was said about specific limits on population density, nor about the
relation of building size to the capacities of traffic arteries or mass
transit services.
As enacted, the 1916 Resolution established five classes of height
come when effort should be made to regulate the height, size and arrangement of
buildings erected within the limits of the City of New York; in order to arrest the
seriously increasing evil of the shutting off of light and air from other buildings
and from the public streets, to prevent unwholesome and dangerous congestion both
in living conditions and in street and transit traffic and to reduce the hazards of
fire and peril to life ....
Id. at 1.
On the 1913 Report, see S. MAKIELSKt, supra note 3, at 20-23; S. TotL, supra note 1,
at 143-71.
29. Height and court restrictions should be framed with a view to securing to each
district as much light, air, relief from congestion and safety from fire as is con-
sistent with a proper regard for the most beneficial use of the land and as is prac-
ticable under existing conditions as to improvements and land values.
1913 REPoRT, supra note 28, at 67. The Commissioners demonstrated so much concern
for "safeguarding of existing and future investments and the encouragement of an ap-
propriate and orderly building development," id. at 68, that protection of health and life
became almost secondary.
30. Although the concern with office skyscrapers had brought the Commission into
being, the 1913 Report revealed that not those buildings but department stores and hotels
had the greatest average heights. Nevertheless,
the much greater proportion of high office buildings and their concentration in a
few areas make the determination of a maximum rule applicable to all buildings
very largely a question of determining what rule will be most appropriate for office
buildings in the areas of maximum congestion.
1913 REPORT, supra note 28, at 17.
31. At this time New York was virtually without any direct controls over height,
save for apartment and tenement houses which were held to one and a half times the
width of the widest abutting street. However, Chicago, Baltimore, Washington. Boston
and a number of other American cities had direct controls over building height by
1913. See S. Tort., supra note 1, at 155. The Supreme Court had reviewed Boston's height
control regulations, holding that it was constitutional to enact such controls. Welch v.
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). A decade after the passage of the New York Resolution, the
Court held that comprehensive zoning, going beyond mere height regulations, was also
a constitutional exercise of the police power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
32. Setback regulations require that a building, after rising from the street or lot line
a certain height, must be set back from that line at some fixed ratio, for example, one
foot for each three feet of height. The setback regulation is responsible for the distinctive
pyramid effect of buildings in downtown New York and other large cities.
33. George B. Ford, architect and secretary to the Commission (and later author of
the leading study of building bulk regulations, see note 11 supra, carved soap models of
the possible envelopes of skyscrapers in order to visualize their height and setback con-
figurations. E. BAsssaT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 125 (1939), cited in S. ToLL, supra note 1, at 165.
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districts, based on street width.34 Towers could rise to any height
as long as they covered at their base not more than twenty-five per
cent of the lot area and observed certain given setbacks from the
streets.35 The 1916 Resolution also introduced a bonus provision, al-
lowing a builder to add height if he provided open space beyond
that required by the applicable district ordinance.30
Unfortunately, the planning philosophy of the Resolution was not
as straightforward as its technique. "It is too big a city, the social
and economic interests involved are too great to permit the con-
tinuance of the laissez faire methods of earlier days," the accom-
panying report proclaimed; but several pages later "economic in-
terests" had triumphed over "social" ones: "No limit can be set to
the growth and expansion of the city." 37
B. Recidivism and Reform: The 1961 Zoning Resolution
Within a decade planners were observing that the 1916 height and
area regulations were inadequate. 38 Height zoning, while altering the
form and indirectly limiting the bulk of skyscrapers, still permitted
the crowding together of towering structures and encouraged separate
buildings which overshadowed their districts. 0
Between 1925 and 1931, Manhattan's office space increased by
ninety-two per cent, and the next two years added yet another fifty-
six per cent, including the Empire State Building and Rockefeller
Center. The Grand Central area alone saw seventy new office build-
ings erected between 1921 and 1946.40 Belatedly, planners noted the
34. The height districts (designated as districts A through E) were the "one-times,"
"one-and.quarter-times," "one-and-half-times," "two-times," and "two-and.half-times" dis.
tricts. Where the height map showed a "one-times" district, the height of a new build-
ing could generally not be greater than one times the street width (which of course
meant the actual width of the street). G. FoRD, NEW YORK CITY BUILDING ZONE RESOLU-
TION 6-15 (New York Title & Mortgage Co. 1917), cited in Sussna, supra note 7, at 158 n1.0.
The Commissioners' Plan of New York City of 1811, which established New York's grid.
iron pattern, had provided for broad thoroughfares. That plan laid out a dozen north.
south avenues, each 100 feet wide. Crossing these at right angles every 200 feet were
155 streets, each sixty feet wide, running east-west between the two rivers. See j. REI'S,
THE MAKING OF URBAN AMERIcA 296-99 (1965).
35. CITY OF NEW YORK, BUILDING ZONE PLAN 19 (1916), cited in Sussna, supra note 7,
at 159 n.11.
36. The amount of prescribed open space for a lot became progressiveiy greater In the
five height districts A through E. But if property owners in C and D districts set aside, in
addition to other required open space, ten per cent of the lot area for the joint recrea-
tional space of the plot, they could build according to the requirements of B and C
districts. Id. at 22-24, cited in Sussna, supra note 7, at 160 n.16.
37. NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON BUILDING DISTRICTS AND RESTRICTIONS, FINAL RE-
PORT 9, 46 (Supp. ed., The City Club of N.Y. 1916).
38. Horowitz, Bassett on Density Zoning, ZONING DIGEST, Aug. 1963, at 194, 195.
39. C. RODGERS, supra note 27, at 168; S. TOLL, supra note 1, at 204.
40. In the same period, only twenty new buildings rose in the former center of sky-
scraper construction, the financial district, while eighteen new ones were completed In
the Times Square area. OFSIcEs, supra note 16, at 153.
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obvious: Subway traffic at express stops increased roughly in pro-
portion to the increase in rentable floor space. As a solution, the
nation's foremost expert on building height and setback regulations
suggested in 1931 that "it might well be good business to provide
the additional transit facilities as needed." 4'
Belatedly, too, New York City's planners calculated the building
capacity of the 1916 Resolution. They found that if the city were
developed to the densities permitted by the zoning envelope, its resi-
dential districts alone would house seventy-seven million people; the
commercial districts would embrace a working population of three
hundred and forty-four million.42 Planning control was reasserted in
1944, when the height and area regulations of the more intensive
districts were lowered to those in effect for the next most restrictive
district. But the Planning Commission did not depart from the basic
mechanics of the original Resolution and continued to regulate build-
ing size through height, setback, and area restrictions.43
As density controls, these techniques were indirect and inefficient.
Students of New York's bulk zoning came to realize that height and
setback restrictions were almost entirely devices to insure adequate
light and air, which only incidentally limited the concentration of
the working population.44 Admittedly, a city planner could deter-
mine the maximum building size allowable on each lot, translate
this into square feet of floor space, divide that figure by an estimate
41. G. FoRD, supra note 11, at 46.
42. Ackerman, Population Expectations, Zoning, Appraisals, and Debt, 49 A.InU.N
CITY, Oct. 1934, at 49, 50. During the Planning Commission campaign for the passage of
the 1961 Zoning Resolution, the Commission chairman cited slightly smaller figures:
"The city that our present zoning would permit is a nightmare of 55 million residents
and 250 million workers." Felt, Preface to Voowmms, WALKER, S.ml & S.Imr, ZONING
NEw YORK Crry at vi (1959) [hereinafter cited as ZONING NEw YORE Crr]. The dif-
ference may be explained by changed assumptions on the nature of new development,
family size, trends in floor space per worker and other such variables. While the cons-
parable residential figure under the 1961 Zoning Resolution is for a population of
10,900,000, ZONING NEW YORK Crry, supra, at 5, the potential working populatIon capacity
of the central business district was not published, if indeed ever calculated. "In any event
that issue is really academic since the problem is not what the theoretical capacity was
or is, but rather some realistic approach to what legitimate needs are and how best to
balance These." Letter from Edwin Friedman, Assistant District Director for Metropolitan
New York, State of New York Executive Department of Planning Services, to author,
Feb. 25, 1972, on file at Yale Law Journal.
43. NEW YORK CITY PLANNING Comamissto, REPORT ox AMsNDEss S OF TIIE ZONING
RESOLUTION OF THE CrrY OF NEW YORK AFFECTNG HElalrr AND AREA 16 (1944). The persist-
ent use of the old tools of regulation is revealed by a comparison of zoning textbooks
written before and after the 1944 amendments. See G. S.trrH, TIlE LAw AND PRACICE OF
ZONING 458-60, 462-69 (1937); L. SQUIRE, ZONING IN NEW YoRK 18, 31 (1948).
44. Williams, Deficiencies of Zoning Law and Legal Decisions, in Ame. Soc'y or P.AN-
NING OFFICIALS, PLANNING 1950, at 164 (1951); Toll, Zoning for Amrenities, 20 LAw & CoN-
TFMP. PROB. 266 (1955); Vladeck, Large Scale Developments and One House Controls,
20 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 255 (1955); Note, Building Size, Shape and Placement Regu-
lations: Bulk Control Zoning Reexamined, 60 YALE L.J. 506, 514-15 (1951).
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of floor space per employee, and arrive at the maximum working
population of an area. 45 But this is not an easily reversible computa-
tion. One cannot use a desired density to generate an ideal height and
setback configuration. Furthermore, the aim of all these calculations
may be thwarted by a builder who lowers ceiling heights and thereby
squeezes more stories into the permitted height of the building. 40
Direct regulation of density was possible, however, through the Floor
Area Ratio (FAR) technique. This ratio is an index figure which ex-
presses the total allowable floor area of a building as a multiple of
the area of its lot.47 A 10,000 square foot lot, in a district where the
FAR was twelve, would thus be limited to a maximum of 120,000
square feet of floor space. The latter figure is thus a constant control
on the density of the lot. The builder can double the height of his
building (provided he does not exceed the absolute height limitation
of the district), but then can build on only half the lot, in order to
stay within the maximum square footage of the FAR zoning envelope.
The FAR device had been incorporated into the zoning ordinance
for the city's lowest density residential districts as early as 1940,48
but was bypassed in the general rezoning of 1944. Not until the Resolu-
tion of 1961, after seventeen years of political maneuvering and two
major reports by architectural consultants, were FAR controls ex-
tended to the city's commercial areas. 40 By that time, attention had
turned from the need for FAR controls in the congested central busi-
ness districts to the determination of their upper limits.
By fixing the maximum office floor space that can be erected in a
city's downtown districts, FAR regulations limit the growth of busi-
ness. Developers argued that setting the FAR too low would make it
almost impossible to erect buildings big enough for the largest com-
panies. The builders also complained that, because of the FAR limit,
the taller the building erected, the smaller its floor plan will be, the
less efficient office space it will provide, and the more space its eleva-
tors will use.50
45. See Toll, supra note 44, at 273.
46. ZONING NEW YORK CITY, supra note 42, at 49.
47. Am. Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, FLOOR AREA RATIO (Planning Advisory Service
Report No. 111, 1958), provides a discussion of the device.
48. See Note, supra note 44, at 518 n.50. Four years later, the floor area ratio
technique was described as "a comparatively recent concept." AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N,
'PLANNING THE NEIGHBORHOOD 40 (1948), cited in Toll, supra note 44, at 274 n.27. In
1955 one commentator observed that the floor area ratio regulation had, up to that
time, appeared in but one case, decided in Ohio in 1925, in which there was dictitn
approval. Toll, supra note 44, at 274 n.27. The date of the case indicates the long
dormancy of the technique.
49. S. MAKIELSKI, supra note 3, at 71-106.
50. See, e.g., OFFICEs, supra note 16, at 280-81. Offices was written under tile spon-
sorship of the National Association of Building Owners and Managers (now the Building
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Consultants hired in 1956 for the rezoning attempted to balance
the builders' desires with the predictable needs of the city. The con-
sultants took account of the size of the future national economy, New
York's share of national office construction, future office employ-
ment, anticipated floor space per employee, and the amount of office
space constructed since World War II. Their projections, extrapolated
through 1975, indicated that there was likely to be an annual increase
of about three million square feet of rentable space. Allowing for
demolitions, more space per worker in existing buildings, and a some-
what higher vacancy rate, this amount of new construction would
provide space for an additional 185,000 office workers by 1975.51
The amount of additional land needed to provide for this new of-
fice space naturally depended upon the FAR level. If the FAR were
ten, 162 acres would be necessary, while a ratio of fifteen would permit
the same intensity of development on 108 acres. The consultants'
studies of post-World War II office buildings, erected under the old
height and setback regulations, produced an average FAR of fifteen.
Since developers had been building profitably at that level, and the
108 acres required to accommodate the projected increase in floor
space at that level was "a modest amount relative to total commercial
land available in the Central Business District" (Manhattan, south
from 59th Street), the Planning Commission established fifteen as
the FAR in its highest density commercial districts under the 1961
Resolution.52
New York's builders and realtors objected strenuously to any re-
duction in bulk regulations in the new zoning ordinance. 3 To win
their support for the 1961 Resolution 54 the planners incorporated two
further features which undermined the limitation on building bulk
represented by the FAR of fifteen. The first was a bonus device"
Owners and Managers Association International) in 1959, and was p.ublished just as the
technique was gaining popularity among city planners. See Ams. Soc V OF PLANNING OF'I-
cA, supra note 47.
51. ZONING NE'W YORK CITY, supra note 42, at 10-11.
52. Id. at 11. For a compilation of the present FAR ceilings in the central business
districts of fourteen other major American cities, see Am. Soc'v OF PLANNING OFFictAts,
CBD ZONING CONTROLS IN SELacrE CrEs (Planning Advisory Service Information Report
No. 180, 1963). These ranged from a maximum FAR of 8 in Philadelphia to a maximum
of 32.1 in Minneapolis. By contrast, the FAR ceiling in London's commercial districts
is 4.5. Kahn, Real Estate With A British Accent, RF-AL EsTrATE Rav., Fall 1971, at 72. 73.
53. See S. MAKxiELst, supra note 3, at 133-34, 137-38.
54. [T]he FAR limits were arrived at empirically, based on the fact that two-
thirds of post-war office construction took place at FAR's of less than 18. the
maximum proposed under the 1961 legislation. The final numbers were to some
extent arrived at pragmatically as a result of a consensus of interests within the City.
Letter from Norman Marcus, General Counsel, New York City Planning Commission
to author, Mar. 2, 1972, on file at Yale Law Journal.
55. For the initial use of the bonus device in New York City's zoning, see p. 344 supra.
The Yale Law Journal
which granted a developer a twenty per cent increase in permitted
floor area in exchange for a plaza surrounding his building.5 A build-
er might therefore increase his FAR from fifteen to eighteen simply
by covering less of his lot and putting more of his permitted bulk
into a tower.
The second innovation was a liberalization in the definition of
the zoning lot to which the FAR figure was applied. The 1961 Resolu-
tion defines the term "zoning lot" to include not only the project
site, but also any other parcel located within the same city block
owned by the developer. For the purpose of this definition, owner-
ship of all or part of a zoning lot includes control through a lease
of at least seventy-five years.51 By leasing an adjacent underdeveloped
or vacant parcel on a long-term basis and designating it as part of his
total "zoning lot," a developer can add the authorized but unbuilt
bulk of the leased parcel to the bulk of his project site.
The developers' enthusiastic adoption of this embryonic form of
56. "The slight increase in maximum permitted bulk resulting from this bonus
is well justified by the benefits of increased open space." ZONING NEw YORK CITY,
supra note 42, at 127. Despite this explanation, other reasons for the FAR bonus were
not aesthetic but political and economic. See note 54 supra. This twenty per cent floor
area bonus provision has since proven to be "one of the most widely used features
of New York City's 1961 zoning resolution." Barnett, Case Studies in Creative Urban
Zoning, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPT:' AND
TECHNIQUES 125, 127 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Tim
NEW ZONING].
57. The New York City Zoning Resolution defines the term "zoning lot" to include
the following:
(c) A tract of land, located within a single block, which at the time of filing
for a building permit . . . is designated by its owner or developer as a
tract all of which is to be used, developed, or built upon as a unit tnder
single ownership.
A zoning lot, therefore, may or may not coincide with a lot as shown on the official
tax maps of the City of New York, or on any recorded subdivision plan or deed.
For the purposes of this definition, ownership of a zoning lot shall be deemed
to include a lease of not less than 50 years duration, with an option to renew
such lease so as to provide a total lease of not less than 75 years duration.
NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. 1, ch. 2, 12-10 (1971).
Although the concept of the "zoning lot" was first explicitly introduced by the 1961
Zoning Resolution, there were attempts to utilize it in the prior Resolution. Without
express authorization, however, the courts refused to accept it. Letter from Norman
Marcus, note 54 supra. However, in 1972 the New York Court of Appeals gave Its
blessing to what General Counsel Marcus called the "contiguous lot assemblage
siphoning principle," even where the parties to the lease evidenced no express In-
tention to reach that result. In that case the defendant's lease of the plaintiff's property,
executed in 1953, had a minimum term of twenty-one years with options to retew
for additional periods until the year 2052, and the defendant owned contiguous
parcels in fee. The Court of Appeals held that he was entitled to full utilization ol
the leased parcel's development rights, absent a provision in the lease precluding
their transfer-despite the fact, unmentioned by the court, that such a transfer was
not even possible until the adoption of the 1961 Zoning Resolution, eight years after
the lease was signed. Newport Associates, Inc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 332 N.Y.S.2d
617, 283 N.E.2d 600 (1972).
For examples of the "zoning lot" concept in other cities' ordinances, see CICAGO,
ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 194A, art. 3.2 (1970); AM. Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS,
GLOSSARY OF ZONING DEFINITIONS 12-13 (Planning Advisory Service Report No. 233, 1968).
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development rights transfer has been an important factor in prompt-
ing the city to adopt additional transfer provisions. To their use and
abuse, this Note now turns.
II. The Transfer of Development Rights
In 1968, the Planning Commission enacted its first major develop-
ment rights transfer regulation for a specific class of structures. This
regulation (Section 74-79 of the zoning ordinance) was intended to
supplement existing programs for landmark preservation, by permit-
ting the owner of a landmark to transfer his authorized but unused
floor area to adjacent parcels for development. 6
Landmarks were endangered both by the zoning ordinance's en-
couragement of new office buildings and by urban economics. Older
buildings not only enhanced the city's character through their his-
toric associations and architectural distinction;5 they also provided
wells of light and air amid the skyscrapers. Yet their economic return
could never approach that of the office towers which might replace
them, so the urge to demolish was overwhelming.60
The intensive development of New York office space that began
with the birth of the skyscraper in the late nineteenth century took
its toll: In Manhattan today there is not a single building dating back
to the seventeenth century and only nine going back to the eight-
eenth. 61 In the twentieth century, successive waves of skyscraper con-
struction were equally destructive of the city's architectural heritage.
The office boom of the late 1950's2 was particularly devastating. 3
Although the New York Community Trust, a private organization,
initiated a program of mounting bronze plaques on landmark struc-
58. New York City Planning Commission, Minutes 302 (May I. 198).
59. J. PYKE, LANDMARK PRESERVATION 2-3 (Citizens Union Research Foundation, Inc.,
1970) [hereinafter cited as LANDMAE.K PRESERVATION].
60. For example, the construction of Lincoln Center during the late 1950's made
the venerable Carnegie Hall expendable, and its owners subsequently announced
their intention to raze the historic Hall and replace it with a modern office tower. Given
the economics of midtown Manhattan, the Hall's owners were undoubtedly correct
in asserting that they could realize more income from a commercial building located
on the same site. Only when area businessmen and landlords joined the chorus
of protest, because they depended upon the continued presence of the Hall, was
the building saved through purchase by a quasi-public corporation. LAJND RAK Pn SuVA-
TioN , supra note 59, at 3.
61, Id. at 15.
62. See Jacobs, New York's Office Boom, ARCh. FORUN, Mar. 1957, at 104.
63. "The list of casualties included Pennsylvania Station, the Metropolitan Opera
House, and the Singer and Guaranty Trust buildings on lower Broadway and the
Brokaw mansions. In addition, during this time at least two other landmarks,
the Times Tower and the Black Starr building on Fifth Avenue, were transformed
by the placement of contemporary facades over the old skeletons." LANrWARK PREMSRVA-
TION, supra note 59, at 15.
The Yale Law Journal
tures, 64 the preservation of such buildings was only the incidental
result of a long-term tenancy or holdout owner.
In 1956, the state legislature had amended the General City Law
to permit the acquisition or control of buildings having special aes-
thetic interest or value,6 5 but the city failed to act until pressured by
citizens' preservation groups. 6 In April 1965, the city council en-
acted the Landmarks Preservation Law,6 7 which created the Land-
marks Preservation Commission. That Commission can designate
any appropriate structure or site as a landmark; it can also name any
area of the city possessing special historical, aesthetic, or architectural
interest as an historic district. Both designations are made only after a
public hearing, and must be approved by the city's Board of Estimate,
a group composed of elected officials.66
The Commission is not required to consider the hardships land-
mark designation may impose on the owner of the building, even
though he may not demolish it or alter its exterior without Com-
mission approval.6 9 In practice, however, witnesses at the designation
hearings do testify on the loss in property values expected from
designation.70 After designation, the owner may appeal the Com-
mission's refusal to grant permission for alteration or demolition
only on the ground that he is not receiving a fair return from his
landmark. 71 The statute defines this reasonable return as a net an-
nual return of six per cent of the assessed valuation of the building
and its site. 2 If the landmark owner proves to the Commission's
64. Id.
65. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20 (25-a), (McKinney 1968). The "Bard Law," named
after its sponsor, Albert S. Bard, enabled the cities to adopt "[i]n any such Instance
such measures, [which] if adopted in the exercise of the police power, shall be rea-
sonable and appropriate to the purpose, or if constituting a taking of private property
shall provide for due compensation which may include the limitation or remission
of taxes." Id. Such measures include provision for the "protection, enhancement, per-
petuation or use [of landmarks], which may include appropriate and reasonable
control of the use or appearance of neighboring private property within public view,
or both." Id.
66. LANDMARK PRESERVATION, supra note 59, at 15; NEw YORK CITY PLANNING COM-
MISSION, PLAN FOR NEW YORK CITY, VOL. I: CRITICAL ISSUES 152 (1969) (hereinafter cited
as CRITICAL IssuES].
67. 2 NEw YORK, N.Y., CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-a (1971).
68. For a description of the Landmarks Preservation Commission's powers and
functions, see Wolf, The Landmark Problem in New York, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv.
99 (1967). See also LANDMARK PRESERVATION, supra note 59, at 16-24.
69. See 2 NEW YORK, N.Y., CHART R AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-a, § 207-5.0, a.(l)
(1971).
70. See, e.g., Burks, Owners of Woolworth Building Call Landmark Law 'Onerous'
N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1970, at 27, col. 3.
71. See 2 NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-a, §§ 207-8.0, a(l)-
(2) (1971).
72. See id., § 207-1.0, q. The statute provides that "net annual return" shall be
the excess of earned income from the property over operating expenses, excluding
mortgage interest, amortization, and allowances for obsolescence and reserves, but
including a specified allowance for depreciation.
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satisfaction that he cannot realize this return without alteration or
demolition, the Commission then works with him to devise a plan
for preservation, which provides the required return. In devising
such a plan, the Commission has the power, with the approval of the
Board of Estimate, to grant partial or complete exemption from, or
remission of, taxes.73
By mid-1969, some 285 structures had been designated as land-
marks.74 Of this number, only one could xnot be saved from demoli-
tion.75 This overwhelmingly successful program of preservation has
been achieved without resort to the tax relief possible under the
preservation laws. 7 6 Yet it was allegedly to supplement these tax
abatement provisions that the Planning Commission enacted Section
74-79, allowing transfer of landmarks' unused development rights."
It should be recalled that the 1961 Resolution already permitted the
transfer of potential development rights to a contiguous parcel, pro-
vided that both areas were under the same ownership in the same
designated "zoning lot."78 But this meant that no merger would be
possible where (1) all the sites contiguous to a landmark were already
fully developed, (2) the neighboring buildings were themselves land-
marks, or (3) the planners had elected to preserve a state of "under-
development" in the immediate vicinity of the landmark, as was the
case with certain midblocks of brownstones.70 Moreover, the require-
ment that the lots be under common ownership imposed an addi-
tional barrier.
The 1968 amendment sought to remove these restrictions by
broadening the definition of "contiguous" to include lots across the
street or intersection from the landmark, and by permitting transfers
between separately owned zoning lots. In the 1968 provision, how-
ever, the transferee lot was only permitted a twenty per cent increase
in floor area through the transfer. The new law allowed a landmark
owner to sell portions of his unused development rights to several
adjacent owners, but he could not sell the same portion more than
73. Id., § 207-8.0, a.(2); see LANDMARK PRESERvATiON, supra note 59, at 19.
74. They included forty-three residences, eighty churches and related buildings,
sixty-nine public buildings, fifty industrial and commercial structures, seven cemeteries,
one bridge, and one tree. Although these officially designated landmarks could be
found in every borough and every kind of neighborhood, the majority were in Man-
hattan. CRirscAL IssuEs, supra note 66, at 152.
75. LANDMARK PRESERVATION, supra note 59, at 18-19.
76. See Costonis, supra note 4, at 592 n.60.
77. See note 58 supra.
78. See p. 348 supra.
79. Address by Norman Marcus, Counsel of the New York City Department of
City Planning, at the First Conference on Legal Techniques in Preservation, Washing-
ton, D.C., May 2, 1971, at 3. (Mimeo, copy on file at Yale Law Journal.) A modified
version of this address was later published. See Marcus, supra note 4.
The Yale Law Journal
once. The development rights of the landmark's zoning lot were for-
ever reduced by the amount of rights sold, and notice of the re-
strictions upon further development had to be filed in the appropriate
land records office. Finally, approval of the transfer was conditioned
upon a finding by the Planning Commission:
(a) that the permitted transfer of floor area or minor variations
in the front, height and setback regulations will not unduly in-
crease the bulk of any new development, density of population
or intensity of use in any block, to the detriment of the occupants
of buildings on the block or nearby blocks, and (b) that the
[required] program for continuing maintenance will result in
the preservation of the landmark. s0
In its statement accompanying the rights transfer amendment, the
Planning Commission cited the provision's "multiple benefits."
The owner of a designated landmark building can realize an
economic gain by selling his unbuilt, but allowable, develop-
ment rights; the buyer of these rights, in return, can acquire
additional floor area he would otherwise not have; the neighbor-
hood, meanwhile, can retain an essential amenity, a revitalized
landmark, plus new development harmonious with the charac-
ter of the area and of a quality unobtainable under previous
conditions; the City, most importantly, can benefit by new tax
revenues from what was previously untaxable.81
The Commission's concluding remark clearly identifies development
rights transfer as primarily a method of fiscal 2 rather than aesthetic
zoning. It also suggests that the amendment would provide a good
excuse for not utilizing the tax relief provisions originally enacted to
compensate the landmark owner.8 3 But whatever its fiscal advan-
80. NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. VII, ch. 4, § 74.792 (1971).
81. New York City Planning Commission, Minutes 303 (May 1, 1968). Preservation
organizations greeted the transfer provisions enthusiastically. See, e.g., Gilbert, Saving
Landmarks: The Transfer of Development Rights, His'roIc PRESERVATION, July.Sept.
1970, at 13.
82. "Fiscal zoning" is any act which encourages developments adding more in property
taxes than they cost in public services. In its usual context, the term refers to jurisdictions
which seek industrial and commercial uses and luxury housing. See NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 212 (1969). But it also embraces any
practice which aims to produce tax revenues in excess of the cost of public services
needed to encourage the development-and here, the only costs are the administrative
expenses of the Planning Commission's approval of the development rights transfer, since
the adequacy of public services in the area of transfer is not an explicit prerequisite for
that approval. Former New York City Planning Commission member Beverly Spatt has
publicly denounced development rights transfer as fiscal zoning. See Burks, Planners Seek
to Shift Custom House Air Rights, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1970, at 56, col. 4.
83. See p. 351 supra.
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tages, the new provision proved inadequate in dealing with the "Grand
Central Terminal Crisis,"8 4 a plan to build a fifty-five story office
building over the Terminal, a designated landmark, which would
bring 12,000 more workers into the area.sa
A. Grand Central and Grander Transfers: The 1969 Amendment
In the nineteenth century, the public outcry against the noise, smoke,
and danger of the first trains had caused the city to move progres-
sively northward the boundary below which locomotives could not
run into Manhattan; thus, 42nd Street became the ultimate location
of the present Grand Central Terminal. In 1875, a disastrous pas-
senger train collision forced the New York Central Railroad to ac-
quire several acres of valuable uptown property in order to widen
its narrow tunnel. By 1902, the right-of-way had been redesigned and
put underground to carry 600 trains a day. Above them, Park Avenue
was carried on steel posts, as were nine cross streets similarly bridg-
ing the railyard.8 6
The cost of these improvements was met largely by the sale of air
rights8 7 over the covered tracks to permit the building of commercial
structures along Park Avenue. As hotels, clubs, apartment houses,
and office buildings rose over the forty-eight-acre railyard, it became
one immense realty holding under single ownership. Meanwhile,
"Grand Central City" grew into the transportation transfer center of
the metropolis, bound to the rest of New York not only by surface
streets but also by the old elevated lines and the new subways con-
structed concurrently with the station. 8
In this way, the common carrier became uncommonly wealthy. Its
monumental and sumptuous Terminal, completed in 1913, cost $75
million-$225 million in today's dollars.89 In time, the value of the
land occupied by the Terminal increased enormously, but the rail-
road business declined. This combination naturally led the New York
84. See address by Norman Marcus, supra note 79, at 6.
85. Fowler, Grand Central Tower Will Top Pan Am Building, N.Y. Times, June
20, 1968, at 1, col. 4.
86. OFFIcEs, supra note 16, at 52-54; Haskell, The Lost New York, ARc1t. Fortu.I,
Nov. 1963, at 107.
87. These were air rights in the classic sense of a property interest in a three-
dimensional location in space. None of the buildings constructed on air rights leased
or purchased from the New York (now Penn) Central receives ground rights from its
legal possession of the air above the street level. These superimposed structures have
no basements, and buy electricity, steam and hot water from the railroad. Trustees
of Penn Central Transportation Company, Debtor, Proposed Sale of Mid-Manhattan
Properties: General Memorandum 13-14, Aug. 11, 1971 (on file at Yale Law Journal).
88. Haskell, supra note 86, at 109.
89. Id.
The Yale Law Journal
Central to consider possible means of realizing at least some of the
value of the terminal site. The Terminal represented a FAR of 1.5
in a district with a maximum FAR of eighteen.00 In September 1967,
the New York Central first proposed to build a skyscraper contain-
ing some two million square feet of floor space over the Terminal
waiting room;0 1 in January 1968, the new Penn Central leased that
unused space to a private developer for fifty years at a minimum an-
nual return of $3 million. 2 The erection of a building of such magni-
tude in an area which already suffered from extreme congestion made
city planners shudder. But, given the generous FAR ceiling of the
1961 Resolution, the proposed building was completely within the
zoning law and needed no variance or approval from the Planning
Commission. 3
After more than a year of controversy and the presentation of two
alternative plans by the architect, the Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission finally blocked construction by ruling, in late 1968, that the
proposed development had an exterior effect on the Terminal, which
had been designated a landmark only one month before plans for the
building had been announced. 94 This ruling meant that the proposed
building could not be erected without exhausting the Commission's
various ameliorating procedures. 90 The Penn Central's counsel had
announced that the railroad would go to court to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the landmarks legislation,9" and the negative ruling
triggered a suit against the city for $8 million a year until permission
to build was granted 7
The Terminal presented a situation where a massive amount of
development rights were available to be transferred in an area in
which all the "adjacent" lots, as then defined, were already intensely
90. Shipler, Landmarks Zoning Change Proposed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1969, at 84,
col. 4.
91. Fowler. Grand Central May Get A Tower, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1967, at I, col. 4.
92. Fowler, Breuer To Design Terminal Tower, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1968, at 30,
col. 3.
93. Huxtable, Architecture: Grotesquerie Astride A Palace, N.Y. Times, June 20,
1968, at 37, col. 3.
94. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1967, at 31, col. 6.
95. Shipler, Landmarks Panel Bars Office Tower Over Grand Central, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 27, 1969, at 1, col. 4. The Landmarks Preservation Commission's procedures
after denial of a petition for alteration are described at pp. 350.51 supra.
96. Shipler, New Tower Sought For Grand Central, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1969,
at 1, col. 7.
97. The following press accounts provide a running history of the litlation: N.Y.
Times, Sept. 5, 1969, at 40, col. 1; Tomasson, Penn Central Sues City in Fight to
Build Grand Central Tower, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1969, at 51, col. 2; Waggoner, Officials
Called in Terminal Suit, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1972, at 17, col. 1; Waggoner, An m.
pressive Battery of Legal Talent Joins the Battle To Save Grand Central Terminal
From Destruction, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
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developed. The 1968 amendment noted above was thus of no as-
sistance in solving the Grand Central problem.
In reaction to the proposed tower, the Planning Commission moved
in mid-1968 to acquire greater control over the construction in the
immediate areas of the city's three major transportation centers-
Grand Central, Pennsylvania Station, and the Long Island Railroad
complex in Queens. Within these districts, if established, the Com-
mission would have the discretionary power to restrict the bulk of
any new building to eighty per cent of the size otherwise permitted
under the zoning law. The Commission members
made no secret of the fact that they consider the heavy develop-
ment on the East Side of Manhattan in recent years to have over-
burdened the transportation facilities-rail, rapid transit, vehicu-
lar and pedestrian-in the vicinity of Grand Central. 8
The plan could have rendered the Grand Central office tower
project economically infeasible.9° After public hearings, the proposal
failed to gain the approval of the Commission and the Board of Esti-
mate and was indefinitely tabled.100 How hard the planners fought
98. Fowler, Plan Board Seeks Wider Control of Rail Center, N.Y. Times, July 3,
1968, at 70, col. 5. See also Bennett, City Urged to Bar Terminal Tower, N.Y. Times,
July 14, 1968, at 45, col. I.
The almost total blockage of surface traffic movement in the central business
districts, disregard of limited parking regulations, and extensive double.parking
have long been problems. In 1969 about 50,000 cars were towed off the streets. Se
Ascher, Welcome to New York, 36 PLAxNING: A NEwsS.LErr or THE A?:. Soc'" or
PLANNING OFFIC.Ics 21, 24 (1970).
Before the publication of the master plan in 1969, one noted planner questioned
the lack of realism in the 1961 Resolution with regard to vehicular traffic and off-
street parking. Sussna, Parking and Zoning- A Case Study, 21 T.AFmc Q. 435, 440
(1967). Even Douglas L. Elliman, one of the city's major realtors, advocated keeping
private automobiles out of Manhattan rather than encouraging any increase. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1972, at 32, col. 5.
Following Rome's adoption, in the spring of 1972, of a plan to eliminate mass-
transit fares and ban private motor vehicles from that city's center, spokesmen for
Mayor Lindsay said that while the idea was attractive, especially as a way of
discouraging the use of automobiles in New York, there was no source of financing
for such an endeavor. The Lindsay administration has considered banning private
motor vehicles from the city's center, and a few temporary pedestrian malls have
been created on Madison Avenue and other thoroughfares. But the suggestion of a
permanent ban has brought angry protests from merchants and businessmen, and
no action has been taken. See N.Y. Times, April 1, 1972, at 27, Col. 8.
99. See Fowler, supra note 98.
100. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1968, at 36, col. 3. Ironically, the high FAR ceiling awarded
the Grand Central Terminal area by the 1961 Resolution helped generate the economic
threat to the landmark. The permitted FAR of the Terminal's zoning lot is eighteen.
the Terminal itself being deemed a plaza which entitles the owner to a twenty per cent
bonus above the regular district FAR ceiling of fifteen. See Shipler, supra note 90. Without
those extra FAR rights, which had been added to the 1961 Resolution for political
rather than planning reasons, see note 54 supra and accompanying text, the builder would
have been in the same position that the Planning Commission hoped to put him with
its "special transportation center districts"--that is, unable to afford to erect atop the
landmark an office building any smaller than the full FAR eighteen envelope would
permit.
355
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for their transportation district program is not clear, but they had
proposed it only two months after enacting the first landmark de-
velopment rights transfer provision. Having rubbed that genie out
of the lamp, with all the promises of new construction permitted by
transfer, it was certainly easier for the Commission to modify an ex-
pansive measure rather than to fight for a restrictive one.
The modification finally adopted by the Planning Commission,
with one eye on enhancing its position in the Penn Central suit,1 01
was to amend Section 74-79. The amended transfer provision de-
fined "adjacent" sites in the highest density commercial districts to
include
a lot . . . which is across a street and opposite to another lot or
lots which except for the intervention of streets or street inter-
sections form a series extending to the lot occupied by the land-
mark building. All such lots shall be in the same ownership.102
This amendment, announced October 7, 1969 (the same day the
railroad's suit was filed), allowed the Penn Central to distribute the
Terminal's "excess" development rights among the properties it con-
trolled around the Terminal and up Park Avenue. One such pros-
pective transferee lot was the Barclay Hotel on Lexington Avenue be-
tween 48th and 49th Streets, five blocks away from the Terminal.
With this amendment, development rights could be not merely "si-
phoned off" to nearby parcels, but jumped over entire city blocks.10 3
The 1968 provision had limited development rights transfer to a
twenty per cent increase in FAR on the transferee lot. Because the
Terminal had such a great unused development rights potential, that
limitation would have demanded several transferee redevelopments.
Such widespread redevelopment in the densely-built district around
the Terminal was hardly likely. For this reason the 1969 amendment
revoked the twenty per cent restriction with regard to the highest-
density commercial districts (those with a FAR maximum of eighteen).
101. Shipler, supra note 90.
102. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING REsOLUTION, art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-79 (1971). On .. owner-
ship" of a zoning lot, see note 57 supra.
103. In his analysis of the New York plan of landmark development rights transfer,
Professor Costonis criticizes the ordinance on the ground that transfer call only
take place between contiguous lots. Costonis, supra note 4, at 586.87. But in tils
reading of the New York statute, Costonis seems to have missed the point that transfer
over a greatly enlarged area-the keystone of his own "Chicago Plan"-was possible
in New York more than two years before he published his own rights transfer
proposal. Nor was Professor Costonis the first to suggest that development rights
"hop, skip, and jump" from one lot to another some distance away. This was pro-
posed by New York City Real Estate Commissioner Ira Duchan in April 1970. See Burks,
supra note 4.
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The transfer of all of the unused development rights to one lot was
thus permitted. As the Planning Commission's counsel later observed,
this was a practical decision based on the railroad's eagerness to con-
vert its development rights into revenue-producing office space as
rapidly as possible. 104
The Commission had one further rationale for lifting the twenty
per cent restriction: the "prevalence of non-complying buildings [in
excess of FAR eighteen] in the area," making "one more extra-large
building... relatively innocuous." 1°5 The planners must have been
redefining "innocuous" as well as "adjacent lot": nothing else can
explain the Commission's obliviousness to the transportation chaos
which it was permitting through such a massive transfer of develop-
ment rights.' 06
If the original rights transfer resolution could be characterized as
fiscal zoning,.07 this brief history reveals the 1969 amendment of that
resolution to be a classic case of spot zoning: 108 an amendment en-
acted solely for the benefit of one landowner which was not in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan. 00 Permitting development rights
104. Marcus, supra note 4. at 375.
The Commission was ultimately more concerned with the realistic possibility
that development rights would be transferred than with bowls of light and air
when it amended the original development rights transfer sections to permit
transfer across properties within a common chain of ownership.
Letter from Norman Marcus, supra note 54.
105. Marcus, supra note 4, at 375.
106. Before seeing any plans, the Planning Commission announced that, before
clearing the project, it would have to be satisfied that the new tower would not
overwhelm the Grand Central district with more office workers than its transporta-
tion and services could sustain. Fowler, supra note 91. The concern was justified,
if later effectively abandoned. In the Grand Central area, 80,000 people emerge from
the concrete between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M.; and 200,000 surface in the course of a day.
Huxtable, Slab City Marches On, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 19658, § 2, at 22, col. 1. The
Penn Central's new skyscraper would have brought another 12,000 people into the
area. Fowler, supra note 85. Yet the same 12,000 would be overloading the same area
even if the Terminal's development rights were dispersed among several railroad-
owned lots or transferred in one great block under the amended provision for transfer.
The Commission knew the extent of this strain. In its Plan for New Yorl City,
the master planners noted:
The last major improvement in the subway system was completed in 1935. The
subways are dirty and noisy. Many local lines operate well beneath capacit); but
many express lines are strained way beyond capacity-in particular the lines to
Manhattan, now overloaded by 39,000 passengers during peak hours.
CRrTcAL IssuEs, supra note 66, at 48. The Lexington Avenue express-the only subwvay
line serving the area in which the Terminal development rights would be transferred-
carries 170 persons per car during the rush hour. Id.
107. See p. 352 supra.
108. See R. ANDERSON, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE IN NEw YORK STATE, § 5.03. at 85
(1963); Comment, Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYAcusE L. REv.
303 (1959).
109. The Plan For New York City did not consider permitting development rights
transfers of the magnitude permitted by the 1969 amendment to Section 74-79, even
though the "Grand Central dilemma" is briefly discussed. CRITICAL IssuEs, supra note
66, at 152.
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transfer of such magnitude from the Terminal to a single transferee
lot, given the appalling state of transit facilities in the Grand Central
area, is the very antithesis of rational planning. Under the statute, that
single transferee lot could have a FAR of 34.5,110 almost twice the
current permissible maximum. Fortunately for those who work or
travel in the district, none of the Terminal's development rights have
as yet been transferred."' If it does happen, the owners of buildings
to be overshadowed by the transferee project might well have the
legal opportunity, on a spot zoning theory, to cut their new neighbor
down to size. 112
B. Public Landmarks and Private Levies: The 1970 Amendment
Although roughly one-quarter of New York's designated landmarks
were publicly-owned 1 3 when the original rights transfer amendment
was adopted, that provision applied only to privately-owned land.
marks. Transfers from publicly-owned landmarks, however, could con-
ceivably be made under the 1961 Resolution's definition of "zoning
lot" if the landmark site was contiguous to the developer's parcel and
110. This figure is reached by adding the eighteen FAR, permitted under the
district limit, to the three FAR (twenty per cent) bonus for providing a plaza and
the 16.5 FAR transferred from Grand Central Terminal.
111. After filing its suit against the city, see p. 354 supra, the 1cnn Central
went bankrupt. On June 2, 1971, the bankruptcy trustees offered for sale virtually
all of the railroad's mid-Manhattan property. See Bedingfield, Pennsy WFill Sell 23
Valuable Sites in Mid-Manhattan, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
The only bid on the Terminal's development rights was made by the current
lessee of the air rights, UGP Properties, Inc. UGP made package bids for either
the Roosevelt Hotel or the Biltmore Hotel along with the Terminal development
rights in order to bring itself under the language of the landmark development
rights transfer provision and add to the maximum floor area permitted on tile lot
cleared by the demolition of either hotel. The bankruptcy trustees, who had vowed
they would not sell the properties at "fire sale prices," rejected these bids: However
fair the bids for the hotels standing alone, UGP had offered only $3.5 million for
the fee to the development rights which they were leasing for $3 million a year for the
next half-century. Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1971, at 6, col. 2; ad., Nov. 16, 1971, at 11, col. I.
Although the trustees have since recommended the rejection of nine unexpired leases
of its mid-Manhattan properties, the UGP lease on the Grand Central air rights
was not among them. Id., Jan. 17, 1972, at 14, col. 2.
112. New York's planners have at least acknowledged this legal problem, although
not in the Grand Central Terminal context and not explicitly in terms of the spot
zoning objection. In his address to the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Normuan
Marcus asked rhetorically:
Over how many blocks can the benefit of a preserved landmark be rationalized?
Does, for example, the property owner on East End Avenue buried in the shade
of an overbulk new apartment house benefit from the preservation of a landmark
on Fifth Avenue over a mile away?
Address by Norman Marcus, supra note 79, at 13. See also Marcus, supra note 4, at 378.
Professor Costonis has attempted to construct a legal foundation for transfer of develop.
ment rights over a wide area. See Costonis, supra note 4, at 620-31. There have, however,
been no legal tests of the development rights transfer amendments and proposals dis.
cussed in this Note, since none have been transferred. See pp. 367-68 infra, The ain of
this study is not to decide the legality of development rights transfer, but rather to ques-
tion its utility as a preservation method and its rationality as a zoning device in central
business districts which are already heavily congested.
113. CRITICAL IssuEs, supra note 66, at 152.
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was under his "control."'114 In fact, the first transfer of development
rights from a public landmark used this provision.
In the fall of 1969, an owner of land adjacent to the Appellate Di-
vision Courthouse, a city-owned landmark with Corinthian columns
and rooftop statuary, proposed to construct an office tower contain-
ing approximately a half million square feet; applicable FAR limita-
tions for the district permitted the construction of only 400,000 square
feet. To aid the builder, the city took advantage of its power to lease
municipally-owned buildings for up to ninety-nine years. 113 The de-
veloper leased the courthouse for fifty years with a twenty-five-year
renewal option; he then subleased it back to the city, reserving the
one hundred thousand square feet of floor area he needed for his of-
fice project. Since the developer now had a lease for seventy-five years,
he was deemed to be the owner of the courthouse lot and could com-
bine it with his own to produce more floor space under the district's
FAR.1 6 The city's gain averaged $46,000 per annum-a total for the
lease term of $3,450,000.117 None of this was marked for maintenance
of the courthouse or improvement of the transit systems serving the
huge new office building. Not long thereafter, the Planning Com-
mission amended Section 74-79 to bring publicly-owned landmarks
under its provisions. This 1970 amendment requires a finding by
the Commission,
[t]hat in the case of landmark sites owned by the City, State or
Federal Government, transfer of development rights shall be con-
tingent upon provision by the applicant of a major improvement
of the public pedestrian circulation or transportation system in
the area. 18
114. See p. 348 supra.
115. 1 NEw YoRK, N.Y., CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 15, § 384(b) (1963).
116. As quoted in Sher, "Air Rights" Lease, Zoning, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 1970, at 1,
the operative clause of the lease provides:
Section 401.(a) Tenant is hereby given the right, prior to or during the Demised
Term, to combine the zoning lot of the Demised Premises, with the zoning lot
of the Adjoining Premises, so as to obtain a combined Floor Area Ratio (as de-
fined in the Zoning Resolutions and the Laws of the City of New York) for the
zoning lots of the Demised Premises and the Adjoining Premises: however, as a
result of such combination of zoning lots, Tenant shall not obtain more than
one hundred thousand (100,000) square feet of floor area from the zoning lot of
the Demised Premises.
117. The rent would be $35,000 a year for the first twenty years, and $50,000 for
the remaining fifty-five years, or $3.50 and $5.00 a year per square foot of ground
area, respectively. According to Real Estate Commissioner Ira Duchan, who supervised
the transaction, office rents in that area at the time of transfer were approximately
$7.00 and higher, and based on these figures, the developer would need to increase
his tenants' rents for 520,000 square feet of office space by less than seven cents per
square foot for the first twenty years, and less than ten cents per square foot for the
last fifty-five years, to cover his rental payments to the city for the privilege of
adding 100,000 square feet to his stncture. See Whether Hot or Cold . . . Air Rights
Loom Today, Crry Tn-xE INS. Co. REcoRD, June 1970, at 1.
118. NEw YORK, N.Y., ZONING REsOLUTIoN, art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-792, 5.(c) (1971).
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Clearly, in the future, public benefits were to be extracted as the
price of transfer by levying upon the private builder who would
utilize the development rights. As the Commission's General Counsel
later explained:
The additional requirement in the case of development rights
transfers from public landmarks was an attempt to recognize the
additional obligation borne by the public in supporting its own
landmarks. Transfer of air rights over public landmarks must
therefore accommodate the notion of the private transferee de-
veloper providing a major improvement in the public pedestrian
circulation or transportation system in the area. Developments
incorporating formerly publicly owned air rights are therefore
held to a higher amenity standard than those utilizing privately
owned and transferred air rights. Presumably this negates any
thought that the city might sell air rights solely to bolster the
municipal treasury."19
This admirable objective is, however, tarnished by the circum-
stances surrounding the amendment. The new provision was added,
not as an abstract principle determined after deliberate considera-
tion, but in response to one specific development project. The amend-
ment was the product of a proposal involving the massive but squat
United States Custom House, which faces Bowling Green at the foot
of Broadway. Under the zoning regulations, the Custom House's per-
mitted zoning envelope contains 1,134,000 square feet of floor space,
of which only 344,200 square feet have been developed. The building's
unused development rights, 789,800 square feet, represent a floor area
roughly equal to that of the Woolworth Building. A neighboring de-
veloper wanted to replace his fifteen-story building with a new project,
perhaps as high as fifty stories, using the Custom House's develop-
ment rights. The Planning Commission obliged him by again amend-
ing Section 74-79.120 The Commission held that the 1970 amend-
ment meant that in return for approval of the Custom House trans-
fer, the builder had to make a substantial contribution to increasing
the underground access and corridors to the adjacent Bowling Green
subway station and to contribute to a fund for or take a direct part in
preserving the Custom House.' 21
119. Letter from Norman Marcus, supra note 54.
120. "The zoning law change was specifically carpentered to fit the building plan
at No. 1 Broadway .... " Burks, supra note 4, at col. 2. See also Dissenting Report of
Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt, in 4 New York City Board of Estimate, General
Proceedings 3281-83 (1970). Other details of the Custom House development rights
transfer are given in Burks, Planners Seek to Shift Custom House Air Rights, N.Y.
Times, April 9, 1970, at 56, col. 4.
121. See Burks, supra note 120.
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Whether the Commission might have won a "higher amenity
standard"'122 from the builder is now a moot question, for the trans-
action was never consummated.123 The provision, nevertheless, re-
mains on the books as clear evidence of the Commission's eagerness
to accommodate potential developers. 1 -2 4
C. The Battle of the Brownstones
Although the original rights transfer provision had allowed trans-
fer to "residential developments or enlargements," -1 2 5 all of the trans-
fers actually contemplated or proposed through the fall of 1970 had
involved only office buildings. But the provision recognized that new,
122. See p. 360 supra.
The planners' belated concern for the impact of development rights transfer on
the transit system serving the area was well-founded. In the same year that the Com-
mission hoped to approve the Custom House transaction, more than 14,000.000 riders
used the single, narrow platform of the Bowling Green subway station. Realisticall),
no "higher amenity" could have been extracted from that single builder which would
have countered the added strain of two thousand new workers arriving daily at that
station. Dissenting Report of Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt, supra note 120, at
3282.
123. This occurred for the same reason that no other development rights transfers
have been manifested in new office buildings, i.e., the weak market for new office
floor space in New York. See Strachen, The "Morning After" In New 'ork Is Today,
REAL ESTA-T REv., Fall 1971, at 46; Horsley, Office Leasing Picture Dampens Building
Plans, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1972, § 8, at 1, col. 1; Oser, 'acancy Rate High in Midtown
Offices, id., July 9, 1972, § 8, at 1, col. 5; Brown, Rates of Occupancy in Office Struc-
tures Continue 2-Year Drop, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
124. The new amendment provoked a resounding dissent from Planning Commis-
sioner Beverly Moss Spatt, who said she did not believe the city should be "selling"
zoning rights of public landmarks. Commissioner Spatt wrote:
This leasing is accomplished without referring the matter to the Planning Conm-
mission and, in actuality, makes today's text change meaningless and superfluous.
Leasing and selling air rights in such an ad hoc manner is nothing but spot
zoning. It can only lead to an unplanned future-to chaos.
Dissenting Report of Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt, supra note 120, at 3283.
In an interview during the hearings preceding the amendment's adoption, she
asked, "If we sell the air rights over the Custom House the first time, what will
be next? The Public Library on 42nd Street And the museums?" Burks, supra note
120, at col. 7. A Commission spokesman said later that the development rights oier
the Public Library might indeed be transferred in some future project. Mrs. Spatt.
despite an energetic campaign, was not reappointed to the Commission when her term
expired at the end of 1970. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1971, at 32, col. 2.
The Custom House transfer proposal was a display of both bad planning and
chutzpah. The federal government was and is the fee owner of the Custom House.
and usually takes umbrage when the city designates a federal structure as a land-
mark which cannot be altered or enlarged. With the amendment of May 1970, which
would have made the Custom House transfer possible, the Planning Commission
seemed to propose bartering away development rights belonging to the federal gov-
ernment. The Executive Director of the Landmarks Preservation Commission "con-
ceded a possible conflict of interest with the Federal Government in the Custom
House case." Burks, supra note 4, at 9, col. 4.
125. NEW YoRK, N.Y., ZONING REsOLUTION, art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-79 (1971), reads in
pertinent part:
[T]he City Planning Commission may permit development rights to be tras-
ferred to adjacent lots from lots occupied by landmark buildings . . . and may
permit in the case of residential developments or enlargenents, the minimum
required open space or the minimum lot area per room to be reduced on the
basis of such transfer of development rights ....
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high-rise luxury apartments would also generate greater tax revenues
and was designed to encourage them. Furthermore, no conceptual bar
limited the applicability of development rights transfer to landmarks
alone. Hundreds of older buildings failed to fill the FAR envelope
permitted under the 1961 Zoning Resolution, and very few were
designated landmarks.
It was therefore not surprising that in 1970 the Planning Commis-
sion formulated a zoning amendment which would have allowed
builders of high-rise apartments to exceed their FAR restrictions by
purchasing and utilizing the unused development rights of smaller
townhouses. 12
6
The proposal met determined opposition, however, and the Com-
mission retreated. Six weeks after proposing the amendment, the
Commission announced that it had decided to "either drop the item
or continue the matter to a future hearing in order to reformulate
it."127 The full history of the proposal suggests that its abandonment
was a rare example of a politically expedient decision that was also wise.
The upper East Side of Manhattan, for which the amendment was
primarily designed, 28 is bounded by the East River, Central Park,
59th, and 96th Streets. Its residential population (200,200)129 roughly
equals that of Austin, Texas. 30 As the planners conceded, this area
had seen the greatest concentration of private residential construc-
tion in the city, built upon some of the nation's most expensive real
estate.' 3 ' To allow developers a return on their investments, the 1961
Resolution permitted a living density that would be the highest in
the world: A builder can cover every square inch of the site in con-
structing up to 363 four-room apartments per acre. 132
126. New York City Planning Commission, Rep. CP-21420, in Calendar of the
City Planning Commission of the City of New York, Nov. 18, 1970, at 3.8.
127. Knowles, East Siders Claim High-Rise Victory, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1971, at 1,
col. 2, at 32, col. 5.
128. The change would have applied along the whole East Side, as well as to
a smaller area on the West Side abutting Central Park. See Knowles, supra note 127,
at 1, col. 2. That the fashionable tipper East Side was the real target of the proposal
may be deduced from the Commission's rezoning of fifteen tracts in that area to
permit more high-density apartment projects just over a year after the development
rights plan was defeated. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, at 50, col. 1.
129. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, at 50, col. 1. The same area's population during
the working week is 350,000. Testimony of William J. Diamond, Chairman of Man-
hattan Community Board No. 8 on the Master Plan 1, Feb. 8, 1972 (mimeo, on file
at Yale Law Journal).
130. CRITICAL IssuEs, supra note 66, at 115.
131. Id. at 140. The land cost of Manhattan private high-rise construction has
gone from a range of $30-$70 per square foot in 1960 to the range of $60-S125 per
square foot in 1970. N~w YORK CrrY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, INFILL ZONING,
5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as INFILL ZONING].
132. CRITICAL IssuEs, supra note 66, at 141. To understand what these high densities
mean, one need only compare the population per square mile of the most densely
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Since the 1961 Resolution, such zoning (R-10) has been limited
to the wide north-south avenues and major cross-town streets in Man-
hattan's luxury residential areas. In these areas, the authors of the
official Plan for New York City in 1969 found that,
buildings of great bulk are tolerable. The high level of services
and transportation access and the relative roominess of the apart-
ments are compensation for the high degree of stacking. . . .
To fill up whole neighborhoods with this kind of building, how-
ever, would clearly be wrong. The service load, for one thing,
would be intolerable.
There would be neither space nor sense of space. Most of the
buildings would be in perpetual shadow.
The creation of such luxury tenement districts would be an
act of cannibalization. The smaller scale of the side streets is one
of the major reasons why New York's most pleasant neighbor-
hoods are pleasant-and why big towers on the avenues and cor-
ners can do as well as they do. The towers borrow space and sun-
light from the lower buildings on the side streets.133
To preserve these midblock wells of light and air, the Planning Com-
mission in 1961 had placed the side streets of the upper East Side
under the protection of lower density zoning (R-8), permitting a
maximum of only 247 apartments per acre.134
The Commission released its residential transfer amendment in
November 1970. It proposed to permit the transfer of unused de-
velopment rights from buildings in the midblock R-8 districts to R-10
lots fronting the avenue, where both the R-8 and R-10 districts were
located within the same city block. The amended provisions might
also be applied to the transfer of development rights within a single
zoning lot divided by a boundary between an R-8 district and an
R-10 district. The amendment borrowed the original percentage
zoned areas in Manhattan with that of selected high density districts in other major
cities in the world: Manhattan, 71,145; Paris, 69,368; Tokyo, 63,800; Mexico City, 61,864;
London, 34,315; Moscow, 50,400. The population per square mile of the entire city of
New York is 25,452. Id. at 37. Higher population densities do exist. According to its
latest census, Calcutta has a density of 102,00O per square mile. G. MoovMuOUSE, CALcurr
89 (1972).
133. CrncAL IssuEs, supra note 66, at 141.
134. The Commission came under great pressure to remap these areas to R-10
density: Builders claimed the prices of R-8 tracts were so high that only through re-
zoning could they be profitably developed. CRUICAL IssuEs, supra note 66, at 20.21.
In the 1969 master plan, the Commission correctly rejected this as a circular argu-
ment, even though it deplored the drop in construction of new apartments. Id. at
20-21, 141. Private housing construction of multiple dwelling units in Manhattan
dropped from 5,837 in 1966 to 1,062 in 1970, largely as the result of the risc in the
costs of construction and interest. INFILL ZoNING, supra note 131, at 5, 38.
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limitation of the 1968 transfer law: The builder of the high-rise
might not exceed his FAR limit by more than twenty per cent.
The proposal also required that the transferee developer increase
the amount of open plaza space on his site by as much as he in-
creased the floor space of his building. Since apartment developers
are not ordinarily required by the zoning ordinance to provide such
open space for the public, this provision represented another ap-
plication of the planners' long-standing policy to encourage open
space by permitting buildings to exceed the otherwise applicable
FAR limit. Another provision allowed an avenue developer to pur-
chase any deteriorated side block property, raze it, and add the square
footage to that of his avenue property, although this could be done
only with the Commission's approval. As with the landmarks provi-
sion, transfers would be "irrevocable" and recorded, so that the trans-
ferred rights could no longer be developed on the transferor lot.105
The success of prior development rights transfer amendments hinged
on two factors: the paucity of sites-all landmarks-which would be
affected, and the absence of any organized constituency which would
have to live with the results. In the battle of the brownstones, how-
ever, people who would have to contend with the increased density
and building bulk resulting from development rights transfer on a
scale never before proposed, had a voice. Their response to the plan-
ners was resoundingly negative.18 0
135. New York City Planning Commission, supra note 126.
136. Undaunted by its reversal, the Planning Commission later proposed to allow
public institutions to increase their size by permitting development rights transfer
from smaller, outlying buildings. The Commission argued that the proposed resolution
would not alter the total density permitted an institution, but would permit greater
flexibility in its deployment. Once again Community Planning Board 8's Chairman,
William Diamond, challenged the proposal on the grounds that it would remove
light and air now available to nearby apartments. Van Gelder, Air Rights Issue
Pressed By Board, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1971, at 54, col. 4. This scheme was then
abandoned in favor of a proposed amendment which calls for the "updating of regu-
lations pertaining to large-scale community facility developments, giving the [City
Planning] Commission and the Board of Estimate the power to modify bulk regula-
tions." Under the proposal, such institutions would not have to apply to the Board
of Appeals and Standards in order to alter the size and location of new or existing
construction. Goodman, Planners Vote to Ease Zoning Rules for Commuity In-
stitutions in the City, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1972, at 39, col. 1. Thus, just as its develop.
ment rights transfer plan for the mid-block brownstones was defeated by community
opposition, the Planning Commission has moved to exercise other powers which will yield
the same result: increased bulk in the buildings which were originally to have been the
transferees of unused development rights.
The Commission's most recent proposal was presented at a public hearing on a
developer's plans to replace Tudor City Park, two small, private oases on 42nd Street
near First Avenue, with two new luxury apartment towers. Among the several zoning
amendments drafted by the Commission staff to effect a compromise between the
builder's goals and the local residents' desires was one proposing the establishment
of Special Park Districts, within which the unused development rights of privately
owned open spaces might be transferred to lots within the central business district.
364
Development Rights Transfer in New York City
In defeating the Commission's amendment, the upper East Side
residents cast grave doubt upon the master plan's rosy portrait of the
"high level of services and transportation access" and other ameni-
ties claimed to be available for their neighborhood. Their arguments
were presented by William Diamond, a former Housing Commissioner
in the Lindsay administration, who now chaired Community Plan-
ning Board 8, the city's citizens' advisory panel responsible for the
upper East Side.137
First, transfer of development rights to avenue-front apartments
would increase the actual population density of the area, and thus the
burden on district services and amenities, even though the permis-
sible density under FAR ceilings remained constant. While the upper
East Side's population had grown by over 15,000 since 1960, there
had been no increase in the amount of public open space for com-
munity residents.' 38 The overcrowding on the district's one subway
line was notorious; 139 and the automobiles of the new residents would
add not only to the congestion in the streets but also to the pollution
in the air. 40 Moreover, the huge new buildings would themselves
The transferee lots could be used for either residential or commercial purposes, and
would be limited to a ten per cent overage on the normal FAR; the future use of
the transferor lots would be limited to "park-related passive recreation for the general
public." The specific purpose of the proposal is to "'promote the most desirable use
of land in this area and thus to conserve the value of land and thereby protect the
City's tax revenues." New York City Planning Commission, Rep. CP-..128, in Calendar
of the City Planning Commission of the City of New York, OCL 4. 1972, at 7. At the
hearing the Commission reached no decision on the matter. See Clines, Planning Unit
Approves Forest Hills Compromise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, at 51, col. 1.
157. Community Planning Boards, set up officially tinder the new City Charter.
operate at a local but not necessarily a neighborhood level. See NEw YonK Crr' 'L'-
NING Cosssn SoN, C/P/D/: Cos.rs.uNrry PLANNIG Disnucrs, BOUNDARIES AND 'RO-
CEDURES FOR MODIFICATION (1968). There are twelve such boards in manhattan, sixty in
the city as a whole. Each board has fifty members. Its effectiveness is dependent on the
care with which the Borough President names members, the degree of consideration lie
gives board recommendations, and the spirit on the board itself.
138. Testimony of William J. Diamond, supra note 129, at 5.
139. In 1951 the voters approved a $500 million bond issue which they belieed
would finance a new subway under Second Avenue. Under a little-noted clause in
the law, the money was instead utilized for urgently needed rehabilitation of signal
systems and rolling stock on existing lines. The voters authorized $2.5 billion iI
state borrowing for improved transportation once more in 1967. See Ascher, Supra
note 98, at 23. In 1969, the master planners were still counting on "the projected Sec-
ond Avenue subway" which would "greatly improve access to east midtown, the lower
east side, and downtown, and by doing so take the pressure off the now badly ov er-
crowded Lexington Avenue line." CRMCAL Issuzs, supra note 66, at 16. In October
1972, ground was finally broken for the first part of the Second Avenue line, which
is to be completed in the fall of 1975. This segment is north of the areas for which
development rights transfer devices have been proposed. There is no fin estimate
of completion date for the southern portion of the line. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1972,
at 35, col. 4.
140. Residents of the East Side call their district "asthma alley" because it has
the highest rate of air pollution of any area in the city. Testimony of William J.
Diamond, supra note 129, at 5.
Recently, City officials conceded that one of the metropolis' key air pollutants-sus-
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increase that pollution through their heating, cooling, power genera-
tion, and refuse disposal. 141
Secondly, the amendment, by allowing a developer to buy any side
street property "for which it is found that continued preservation and
maintenance would have been or would be unfeasible or unsafe,"' 12
might encourage owners on side blocks to permit their dwellings to
deteriorate. "We would have introduced a new element, deterioration
for profit, into the already sad decline of livable housing in this
city," Diamond later declared. 143 The absorption of the development
rights of these demolished buildings by luxury high-rises would also
change the character of the neighborhoods by driving away the mid-
dle class, unable to afford the new rents.144
Finally, those midblock wells of light which the city plan had vowed
to preserve 45 were again threatened. Apartment buildings in the R-10
zones along the avenues, generally limited to thirty stories, might go
as high as forty-two under the amended rights transfer scheme.140
pended particulate matter, or dirt-had increased seven per cent over the past three
years despite stepped-up control efforts. Bird, City Air Found 7% Dirtier Than in '69,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1972, at 20, col. 4.
141. In hearings on the selective rezoning discussed at note 128 supra, see also IN-
FILL ZONING, supra note 131, at 38-40, Board 8 Chairman Diamond substantiated this
charge by making public a letter, part of which reads:
I believe an unfortunate and environmentally unacceptable precedent Is being
set by the rezoning of the fifteen R-8 areas in Manhattan to higher density R.10.
It is clear to us now that, unless we change our strategy, there will be areas
of the City in which we will be unable to meet the Federally mandated 1975 air
pollution standards for stationary type pollutants-sulfur dioxide and particulates.
The areas likely to not meet standards include . . . eastern and northern Man-
hattan. Thus, the City should not increase the pollution burden in these areas
by increasing housing density nor should it promote more people moving Into
these unhealthy areas rather than to less polluted areas of the city.
We should gain concessions from the [builder] as to his methods of heating,
cooling, power generation and refuse disposal.
The impact of 700 additional housing units on the eastern Manhattan aIr pol.
lution problem is small to be sure, but the precedent is troubling.
Letter from Fred C. Hart, Acting Commissioner of the New York City Department
of Air Resources, to Donald Elliot, Chairman of the New York City Planning Con-
mission, Jan. 31, 1972, on file at Yale Law Journal.
Obviously, development rights transfer on the scale to be encouraged by proposed
amendment 74-89 would have involved many more than the 700 units which aroused
the Department of Air Resources' concern here.
142. New York City Planning Commission, supra note 126, at 7.
143. Knowles, supra note 128, at 32, col. 5.
144. [The neighborhood groups] fought it primarily to avoid relocation. They
predicted that the proposal would generate the formation of assemblages of sites
and result in ultimate elimination of ethnic and economic diversity from the old
rent-controlled structures. This controversy has underscored the likelihood that
a broadened air rights transfer provision, if applied to old rent.controlled
housing, would cause relocation and social exclusivity.
Marcus, supra note 4, at 378. East Side residents repeated these arguments in com-
batting the Planning Commission's proposal to rezone selected sites a year later. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, at 50, col. 1.
145. See p. 363 supra.
146. Knowles, supra note 127.
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Ironically, forty-two stories was precisely the height of the old Equitable
Building which had darkened the streets of the financial district and
helped provoke New York's first zoning resolution so many years
before. 47
The Commission had declared that its proposed amendment had
two objectives: to stop further redevelopment of the midblocks by
keeping them at their present scale, and to increase the potential
number of dwelling units in new buildings on the avenue. 148 At the
press conference announcing the proposal, preservation was emphasized
as the primary aim. 149 But one year later, following the defeat of this
amendment, the planners were proposing a temporary FAR bonus
for upper East Side sites zoned partially R-8, partially R-10,150 which
suggests that their first priority was indeed construction. Again, de-
velopment rights transfer had been good camouflage for an exercise
in fiscal zoning. The only opponents of the plan were the people
who would have had to live with the results.
III. The Impact of Development Rights Transfer
A. A Solitary Success-Perhaps
With all the sound and fury generated by the rights transfer amend-
ments since 1968, it might be thought that several builders would
have rushed to take advantage of them and thereby contributed to
the preservation of several New York landmarks. In reality, only one
such transfer has been completely processed by the Commission, and
it has yet to be consummated by construction of the new office build-
ing which is to absorb the landmark's development rights. This trans-
action demonstrates both the unreliability of development rights
transfer as a preservation device and the folly of employing the
technique without regard to the impact on existing facilities.
Amster Yard is a designated landmark group of nineteenth-century,
one- to four-story brick residences built around a garden courtyard.
Its lot between East 49th and 50th Streets had several thousand square
147. See note I supra and accompanying text.
148. Marcus, supra note 4, at 378.
149. Weisman, supra note 128:
The principle of transferring air rights has been used before, mostly to allow
owners of landmarks . . . to sell the rights over their structures as a compensation
for not being able to demolish them.
Yesterday's proposal, however, was said to be the first time the principle was
suggested to preserve the quality of a whole neighborhood.
150. See INFiLL ZONNG, supra note 131, at 38-40; N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, at 50.
col. 1.
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feet of unused development rights. The owner of the adjacent lot
proposed to build a forty-story office tower. The permitted zoning
envelope for the tower allowed the development of 544,122 square
feet. By purchasing an additional 30,967 square feet in development
rights from Amster Yard, the developer could build two stories above
the normal limit of forty. Alternatively, he could build larger, more
desirable tower floors averaging 14,000 instead of 12,000 square feet-
a distinct commercial advantage worth at least a $30,000 a year addi-
tional profit.' 5 '
In exchange, the developer made a number of design concessions,
including the use of materials and colors sympathetic to the scale and
style of the landmark and a covered shopping arcade on three sides
of the new structure. The landmark owner or his trustee administra-
tor were to be paid $494,731 over fifteen years for the transferred
rights. Of that sum, $100,000 was to be put in trust for the land-
mark's maintenance' 5 2
"Although processed and tied with a ribbon"''5 3 since the summer
of 1970, the Amster Yard transfer has never been used because the
market for new office space in New York is currently quite weak.1 4
An estimated fourteen million square feet of office space has been
added to the market by buildings completed between 1970 and 1972.
The Planning Commission has estimated that in 1973 as much as
thirty-four million of a total of 225 million square feet will go un-
rented. Only 2,904,000 square feet of new office space was rented in
1971-the lowest amount in the last decade.,'
151. Conti, supra note 4, at 15, col. 5; Huxtable, City Landmark Gets A Chance
For Survival, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1970, § 8, at 1, col. 1.
152. Huxtable, supra note 151.
153. Address by Norman Marcus, supra note 79, at 9.
154. Marcus, supra note 4, at 376. Professor Costonis notes this as the reason for
the delay of the Amster Yard Transfer. Costonis, supra note 4, at 578 n.16. However,
in his indictment of the inefficiency of the "New York plan" for preserving landmarks
through development rights transfer, id. at 586-89, he never mentions the factor on
which development rights transfer in any city must depend: the metropolitan market for
new office building space or high density residential developments. The market is, in turn,
the product of a combination of factors, including the costs of land, labor, and money-
and no mere loosening of the "straightjacket of administrative controls" in New York,
in favor of the arguably more flexible "Chicago plan," is going to remove the market
impediment to landmark preservation through development rights transfer.
The market for commercial space is currently severely depressed in several major cities,
including Chicago (with a vacancy rate of over ten per cent and ten million more square
feet of office space coming on the market by 1975), Boston (vacancy over eight per cent),
Pittsburgh (over twenty-five per cent), Dallas (over twenty-five per cent), Houston, San
Francisco, Los Angeles, Atlanta, St. Louis and Minneapolis. See articles by -lorsley, Oser,
and Brown, supra note 123. And of course, once this excess base is absorbed, tile con-
struction of new buildings incorporating landmark development rights can only mean
increasing the density levels of these downtown areas.
155. Horsley, supra note 123. This oversupply has its roots in the fevered rental
market of the late 1960's. From the mid-1940's through 1966, rental rates for new
space in prime locations moved upward slowly, from $4.50 per square foot to 56.50.
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Thus, the initial defect in any program designed to preserve land-
marks through development rights transfer is that it cannot work
unless a builder wants those development rights, regardless of the dis-
tance he can transfer them.0 0 An eminently more reliable method
of landmark preservation was and is available under the city's Land-
marks Preservation Law,157 and that legislation should continue to
save more architectural monuments than development rights transfer
schemes ever will.
The second flaw in the landmarks version of the device is that any
rights transferred are most likely to flow to areas which are already
highly congested due to those private economic advantages of con-
centration which make transfer attractive in the first place.1s3
The proposed office tower adjacent to Amster Yard has a prime
location, and so development rights transfer making possible two
extra floors would be profitable for the builder. But the structure
will bring about 3600 more workers into the Grand Central area,100
where the present strain on surface and subway transportation is al-
ready intolerable according to both the master planners and those
who travel there. About 200 of those workers will occupy the floor
space transferred from Amster Yard. That is, to be sure, a small
number compared with the 2000 who would be brought in by the
exploitation of the unused development rights of the U.S. Custom
House.'60 But in either case, given the sorry state of mass transit in
But in 1968 rates jumped to $8.50, and by 1969, rentals for 1971 occupancy were going
for $10 per square foot. This rise in rentals was due to the shortage of space brought
about by the rise in employment, which began to move up in 1965 much faster
than before. See Carruth, Manhattan's Office Building Binge, FoRTruNE, Oct. 1969,
at 114, 115.
Where in 1968, some 4,980,000 square feet of office space came on the market. 1969
produced 11,980,000 square feet, 1970 added another 8,651,000. and the city-wide
construction completion figure for 1971 was 14,869,000 square feet-the largest figire
for any year in the postwar era. The city's rate of absorption of office space, which
reached a peak of 9.9 million square feet in 1969, did not keep pace with this rate
of development, and in 1970 only 6.2 million square feet were leased. Horsley. supra
note 123.
156. This objection applies not only to Section 74-79 as amended, but also to Pro-
fessor Costonis" "development rights transfer districts," which would be those areas
where landmarks are concentrated. See Costonis, supra note 4, at 590.
157. See pp. 350-51 supra.
158. See p. 342 supra.
159. The Planning Commission has "nothing so neat as a table of conversion" for
translating floor space into number of employees, but rather feels the figures in the
1961 zoning study are still "useful as rules of thumb." Letter from Norman Marcus,
supra note 54. That study shows an average of 157 square feet per office worker in
1955 with a projected trend upwards to 190 square feet per office worker in 1975.
ZONING Nov YoRx Crry, supra note 42, at 11. The number of workers given in the
text was calculated using the 157 square feet per employee figure.
160. See p. 360 supra, on the Custom House transfer, which was never consummated.
and Dissenting Report of Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt, supra note 120, at 3282, for
the number of new office workers which its unused development rights represent.
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New York and all the attendant ills to which a densely-developed city
is heir, the wisdom of encouraging an increase in congestion through
development rights transfer is at best doubtful.
B. The Larger Failure
The development rights transfer technique has not proven help-
ful in preserving landmarks in New York, and its utilization in a
residential context was seen by the citizens affected as a threat to
the character and viability of their midblock neighborhoods. Almost
assuredly, in order to spur construction and generate increased tax
revenues, the Planning Commission will formulate other versions of
the device. The city's Real Estate Commissioner has proposed wide-
spread transfer of development rights from municipal fire houses,
police stations, and schools, both to adjacent sites and to properties
farther away. The Planning Commission has yet to permit this, but
the siren song of growth may prove irresistible.
But certain conclusions from New York's experience with the
technique are already clear, and these are worth pondering by any
city contemplating its adoption. First, development rights transfer
is not a necessary device for saving landmarks, where the municipal
landmarks commission has other preservation powers and is willing
to employ them.'"' Second, it is not a reliable device for landmark
preservation, because it depends on the local market for new office
161. A wide variety of preservation devices has been developed. See, e.g., R. MONTAGUE
& T. WRENN, PLANNING FOR PRESERVATION (Am. Soc'y of Planning Officials 1964); 1.
MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION (2d ed. 1965); Wolfe, Conservation of Historic
Buildings and Areas-Legal Techniques, in 2 ABA SECTION ON REAL PROP., PROBATE &
TRUST LAW, PROCEEDINGS at 18 (1963); Turnbull, Aesthetic Zoning, 7 WAKE FoREST L.
REV. 230 (1971); Comment, Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L.
REV. 611 (1970); Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the Preservation of
Historic Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 708 (1963); Comment, Aesthetic Zonin&: Preserva-
tion of Historic Areas, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 729 (1961); Special Issue, Historic Preserva.
tion, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 309-444 (1971); Comment. Landmark Preservation Laws:
Compensation for Temporary Taking, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 362 (1968).
It has been argued that the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, discussed
at pp. 350-51 supra, "enables the city's Landmark Commission to exert considerably
greater leverage in dealing with landmark owners than commissions in other cities
enjoy." Costonis, supra note 4, at 581-82 n.30. However well.founded, this observa-
tion is no argument for the adoption of a zoning device such as development rights
transfer if its employment compounds the congestion, pollution, and general aggrava-
tion of living and working in the central city.
Although the National Trust for Historic Preservation does not maintain a list of
-those cities permitting development rights transfer from landmarks, a search of the
Trust's legal archives revealed no cities which authorized transfer other than San
Francisco and New York. Letter from Roger Holt, Assistant for Legal Services, De-
partment of Field Services, National Trust for Historic Preservation, to author, Mar.
10, 1972, on file at Yale Law Journal. San Francisco's law permits the transfer of a
landmark's total unused development rights to adjacent parcels. SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIF., PLANNING CODE § 122.4(b). But a published discussion of this provision does
not reveal how often it has been used. Svirsky, San Francisco: The Downtown De-
velopment Bonus System, in THE NEW ZONING, supra note 56, at 139, 152.
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space. This market may well be glutted through overbuilding or,
ironically, through the extensive utilization of other FAR bonus pro-
visions in the municipal zoning ordinance. 1 2 Third, it is not even a
serviceable device over the long run, unless the city intends to abandon
effective limits on the intensity of development. Only new and bigger
office towers and apartments can absorb the transferred rights, and
this necessarily means increased residential and employee densities. 1 3
Finally, development rights transfer is a pernicious device in today's
congested cities. Whether from landmarks, midblock brownstones,
or municipal buildings, unused rights will always flow to those areas
where the commercial advantages of concentration make transfer
economically attractive. If this existing concentration is attended by
its usual effects-if the subways and buses are overloaded; the streets,
clogged; the air, polluted; and the few remaining open spaces, in the
perpetual shadow of surrounding office or apartment towers-then
development rights transfer can only make life more miserable.
In the final analysis, debate on the merits of development rights
transfer is really an argument about the optimal size of buildings
in the central city. Forty years ago, one commentator cast the con-
troversy in such terms:
Conclusive quantitative proof of the desirability of these things
[sunlight, air, etc.] is almost impossible, as is also the setting up
of any unqualified standard for safety and well-being below which
162. On the depressed market for office space in several major cities, sec note 154
supra. It seems likely that part of this unrentable floor space may have been developed
through other FAR bonus devices, so that the bonus technique and the development
rights transfer technique work at cross-purposes. Indeed, this seems to have been
precisely the result in New York. See note 155 supra. For a comprehensive survey of
the numerous bonus incentive zoning techniques employed in several major American
cities, see M. BRooKs, BoNus PROVISIONS IN CNAL Cmr Anas (Am. Soc'y of Plan-
ning Officials, Planning Advisory Service Report No. 257, 1970).
163. In the first published version of what became the "Chicago Plan," Professor
Costonis wrote of "the problem of super-density":
Transfers under the proposal must be carefully meshed with the municipality's
planning and zoning standards. Prevailing bulk limitations reflect or, at least,
should reflect a careful assessment of the city's space needs and the capacity of its
public services to handle the demands of the projected densities. Addition or re-
arrangement of bulk threatens to upset this assessment ....
Transfers should be permitted only within the highest density commercial and
residential zoning districts. Public services and facilities are most plentiful in these
districts and will not suffer overloads from the margindl density increases resulting
from the program.
J. Costonis & J. Shlas, Development Rights Transfers: A Solution to Chicago's Land-
marks Dilemma 7, May 13, 1971 (Chicago Chapter Foundation of the American In-
stitute of Architects National Trust for Historic Preservation) (emphasis added). Cer-
tainly Costonis and Shlaes are correct in asserting that bulk limitations should reflect
an intelligent assessment of a municipality's needs for space and services. But their
claim that such facilities are most plentiful "within the highest density commercial
and residential zoning districts" is simply not true in New York, and remains unsub-
stantiated with regard to other major American cities in either the jointly-authored
study or the later Costonis article.
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we should not go. The general indications would lead to the be-
lief that, while sunlight, air, outlook, privacy, the avoidance of
a sense of "shut-in-ness" and of actual congestion are highly de-
sirable, we are not able to set up a minimum which, let us say,
if curtailed by 10 percent would spell disaster or if augmented
by 10 percent would spell relative happiness and prosperity.10 4
Because conclusive proof is still lacking, proponents of transfer
schemes can argue with some conviction that this new zoning prac-
tice "is defensible in planning terms."a 6 But whatever the planning
terms, the results of urban concentration are increasingly intolerable
in human terms, and a zoning device aimed at increasing that con-
centration deserves censure rather than praise.
In sum, development rights transfer will be justified only where
planning administrators condition its use on the establishment of open
space and services which adequately satisfy the needs of the existing
population. And even if the planners can meet such conditions, they
should still consider the critique of New York's "new zoning" made
by an administrator of the New York State Office of Planning Services:
The one philosophical point implicit in the 1961 Resolution is
that the attainment of zoned capacity is undesirable, unnecessary
and unwarranted. The envelope that was created was to provide
some reasonable expectation of flexibility within the framework
of planning considerations. The idea of every parcel being de-
veloped to its maximum either directly or through transfer of
development rights, while becoming increasingly popular as a
sophisticated expression of laissez-faire, is essentially a perversion
of all that planning has traditionally stood for. The major thrust
behind much of the new incentive zoning is growth, albeit re-
lated to economics. Growth, too, is the major characteristic of
cancer.' 66
164. Randall, The Question of Size: A Re-Approach to the Study of Zoning, 54
ARCH. FORUM 117 (1931).
165. Costonis, supra note 4, at 629-30. This same attitude is apparent in a recent
publication of the Department of City Planning in New York:
The changes in bulk called for in our proposals would still keep the areas in-
volved well within the theoretical zoned capacity of the 1961 Zoning Resolution,
and many lots affected would only be built with the number of units originally
envisioned because they would merely be exempted from stringent technical rcgula.
tions which had precluded development. Thus, the intent of the 1961 zoning in
matching density with existing and planned facilities would be followed.
INFILL ZONING, supra note 131, at 9.
Yet when these proposed changes in bulk were announced, they provoked great op.
position in the affected neighborhoods precisely because current population densities
had not been matched "with existing and planned facilities." See N.Y. Times, Feb.
13, 1972, at 50, col. 1.
166. Letter from Edwin Friedman, supra note 42.
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